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Abstract 
This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports 
leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some 
basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this static contest to a 
two-period model in order to analyze dynamic aspects of contests. In the second part, 
we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will show 
how the Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. For this 
purpose, we will first explain the value creation process in team sports leagues and 
show how club revenues are related to the contest success function. Then, we present 
some basic modeling issues; for instance, we show how the assumption of flexible vs. 
fixed talent supply depends on the league under consideration and how it influences 
the equilibria. Furthermore, we explicate the effect of revenue sharing on competitive 
balance in the different models. Then we address the relationship between competitive 
balance and social welfare. Finally, we illustrate why many clubs tend to "overinvest" 
in playing talent in many team sports leagues. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explains how contest theory is applied to professional team sports leagues. First, we 
present some peculiarities of the professional team sports industry, which are needed to 
understand the modeling of a sports league.  
The professional team sports industry is characterized by the following major peculiarities: 
First, a distinction has to be made between economic competition and competition on the pitch. 
In sports, any team will try to dominate its opponents and maximize its winning percentage. 
From a league-wide economic point of view, however, the attractiveness of the championship 
might be increasing in the closeness of the competition (competitive balance). As a consequence, 
on aggregate, the absence of single teams dominating the championship is economically 
preferable. This phenomenon is in stark contrast to the notion of economic competition, where 
the goal of any competitor is to attain monopoly status in order to maximize its profits. Unlike 
Toyota, Microsoft, and Wal-Mart, who benefit from weak competitors in their respective 
industries, Real Madrid and the New York Yankees need strong competitors to maximize their 
revenues. In sports, a weak team produces a negative externality on its stronger competitors.  
In sportive competition, scholars such as Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) have 
recognized early on that an on-pitch monopoly of any single team will lower the team’s profits as 
the championship becomes unattractive and demand subsequently decreases. This is the so-called 
"uncertainty of outcome" hypothesis. Hence, in order to produce a valuable product, it is 
necessary for any team to possess potent competitors and a league that coordinates the 
championship. 
Second, any championship race must possess monopoly status per definition. The validity of 
the championship primarily rests on this monopoly status. If there are several championships per 
market area and sport, no consistent ranking of all performers is achieved and, hence, the 
championship will lose a significant part of its value for consumers. A brief look at the history of 
Major League sports shows that the periods of inter-league competition have been rather short 
and ended in mergers if the contender succeeded in seriously challenging the established league 
at all.1 In European soccer, this uniqueness of national championships is additionally enforced on 
a formal basis by UEFA’s lack of approval for any national league not licensed by the respective 
                                                
1 Quirk and Fort (1992) and Fort (2003). 
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national soccer federation. The definitory monopoly status of Major Leagues yields an important 
consequence for the participating clubs. Investments of club-owners into their teams are specific 
in the sense that they cannot be transferred to alternative, equally profitable endeavors. Any 
individual club-owner has no economically viable exit-option from a monopolistic Major League 
other than shutting down and selling the team. Therefore, whenever clubs and the league 
coordinate their relations via contracts, a hold-up risk arises. Having made investments into the 
teams, club-owners cannot redirect their investments into other businesses without losing a 
significant part of their value and are thus forced to accept whichever conditions are offered by 
the league governing body. While European soccer clubs have tried to adapt to this situation by 
striving to increase their independence from association-governed soccer leagues, the full extent 
of such a situation is felt in F1 motor racing. Even though no single club-owner can produce a 
championship race on his own, some subset of clubs may be tempted to threaten to set up some 
competing league - knowing that the probability of success of such a league might be low a 
priori. 2  A standard remedy in the presence of specific investments that helps avoiding 
unproductive rent seeking is the vertical integration of the two levels of production. The 
unification of club-owners and the league body under one single corporate roof solves the 
hold-up problem. Unfortunately, it gives rise to new problems (i.e. integrity, moral hazard) 
affecting revenue and profits in a detrimental manner.3 
Third, professional team sports create various satellite markets, which may generate even 
larger revenues than the primary sports market. A typical example of such a satellite market is 
the betting market. 
Due to its peculiarities and perhaps its popularity, the professional team sports industry enjoys 
several exemptions from common antitrust regulations. For example, salary caps (Késenne, 
2000b; Dietl, Lang, and Rathke, 2009, 2011), transfer restrictions (Dietl, Franck, and Lang, 
2008b) and centralized marketing by league monopolies (Falconieri, Palomino, Sakovics, 2004) 
would not be tolerated in other industries. These exceptions result in very interesting labor 
market peculiarities within professional team sports. These peculiarities make the industry of 
professional team sports an interesting research field for economists. Since the industry is 
                                                
2 This is exactly what could - until recently - be observed in F1, where a subset of racing teams threatened not to 
prolong the "concorde agreement", the agreement governing relations between the team association FOCA and the 
F1 management, in order to start an own racing league dubbed GPWC. 
3 Dietl, Franck, Hasan and Lang (2009) show how forward integration of clubs into the stage of championship 
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organized differently across the world and we even can often observe different institutional 
arrangements within a given country, professional team sports is an interesting source of natural 
experiments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the traditional 
Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this 
static contest to a two-period model in order to analyze dynamic aspects of contests. In Section 3, 
we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will show how the 
Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. The article ends with a short 
conclusion in Section 4. 
2. A Simple Contest Model 
2.1 The Basic Tullock Contest 
We consider a contest in which two risk-neutral contestants are competing to win a prize. The 
contestants differ with respect to the valuation of the prize, where iv  denotes contestant i 's 
valuation of the contest prize.4 Each contestant 1,2i =  independently expends irreversible and 
costly effort 0ie ≥ , which will determine via the contest success function (CSF) which contestant 
will receive the prize. Formally, the CSF maps efforts 1 2( , )e e  into probabilities of winning the 
prize for the different contestants. We will only consider the logit formulation, which is probably 
the most widely used functional form in sporting contests. Its general form was introduced 
Tullock (1980) and subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998).5 
The probability of success for contestant 1,2i =  in a Tullock contest is defined as 
                  
{ }
1 2
1 2
1 2
if max , 0
( , )  
1/ otherwise
ie
e ei
e e
p e e
n
γ
γ γ+
⎧ >⎪= ⎨
⎪⎩
                     (1) 
Note that (1) incorporates an adding-up constraint such that the probabilities must sum up to 
unity, i.e., 1 2 1p p+ = . The probability of success ip  increases in i 's own effort and decreases in 
                                                                                                                                                       
production increases league productivity relative to a contractual interaction of clubs and the league. 
4See also Nti (1999). Another possibility to model an asymmetric contest is via different marginal costs with respect 
to effort (see Szymanski and Valletti, 2005) or via different abilities in the CSF (see Dixit, 1987). 
5For surveys of this CSF in a rent-seeking contest, see Nitzan (1994); Lockard and Tullock (2001). For general 
properties of this CSF, see Nti (1997). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (Lazear and Rosen, 
1981; Dixit, 1987) and the difference-form CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989). 
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the effort of the other contestants. Moreover, the parameter 0γ > , the so-called "discriminatory 
power" of the CSF, measures the sensitivity of success to effort. As γ  increases, the marginal 
cost of influencing the probability of success decreases, i.e., the probability of winning the 
contest increases for the contestant with the highest level of efforts, and differences in effort 
levels affect the winning probability in a stronger way.6 For all (0, )γ ∈ ∞ , the contest under 
consideration is a so-called "non discriminatory" contest. 
In the limiting case where γ  approaches infinity, we would have a so-called "fully 
discriminatory" contest where the contestant with the highest effort wins the prize with 
certainty.7 This form of contest is equivalent to an "all-pay auction" in which all bidders must 
pay regardless of whether they win the prize, which is then awarded to the bidder with the 
highest bid.8 An all-pay auction type of contest is an appropriate approach whenever contestants 
compete, e.g., in footraces, in which an objective standard like "time" measures success. In 
contrast, team sports leagues are usually modeled via the "non discriminatory" Tullock contest. 
Efforts generate costs according to a cost function ( )i ic e , which in the classic contest 
literature is often assumed to be linear such that9  
( ) ,i i ic e c e= ⋅  
where 0c >  is the (constant) marginal cost of efforts. 
The expected payoff of contestant i  is given by the probability of success ip  multiplied by 
the value of the contest prize iv , less the cost of effort: 
1 2
( ) ii i i i i i
e
p v c e v ce
e e
γ
γ γπ = − = −+
 
The reaction function of contestant i, which describes the best response to any possible effort 
choice of the other contestant, can be computed from the following FOCs:  
                                                
6Note that 
( )
1,
2
1
ln
0
en i
i jj j i e ji
n
jj
e e
p
i j
e
e e
γ γ
γγ
= ≠
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∂
∑
= > ⇔ >
∑
 for all j i≠ . 
7For existence conditions of Nash equilibria, see Konrad (2007). 
8See, e.g., Baye, Kovenock, de Vries (1996). Note that in such a framework with complete information, only Nash 
equilibria in mixed strategies exist (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin 1986a,b). 
9Exceptions are Moldovanu and Sela (2001), who analyze the optimal allocation of prizes in an all-pay auction type 
of contest in which contestants can have linear, concave or convex effort costs. For a dynamic Tullock contest with 
convex costs, see, e.g., Grossmann and Dietl (2009) and Grossmann, Dietl, Lang (2010). 
 
 6 
1
2
1 2( )
i j
i
e e
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e e
γ γ
γ γ
γ −
=
+
, 
with , 1,2,  i j i j= ≠ . The Nash equilibrium 1 2( , )e e
∗ ∗  in pure strategies is then characterized by 
the intersection of the two reaction functions and is given by  
( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 2 1
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
( , ) , ,
( , ) , .
v v v v
e e
c v v c v v
v v
p p
v v v v
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ+ +∗ ∗
∗ ∗
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 
The contestant with the higher valuation of the contest prize expends more effort and wins with a 
higher probability. Moreover, individual and aggregate efforts are increasing in the valuation of 
the prize and in the discriminatory power of the CSF. Finally, aggregate effort decreases if the 
contestants become more heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of the contest prize. 
2.2 Transitional Dynamics in the Tullock Contest 
Contests frequently occur dynamically in several periods because effort decisions are often 
intertemporarily connected. The effort a contestant exerts in today's contest may affect the 
probability of winning tomorrow's contest. Examples are numerous: many military conflicts 
endure for long periods of time, and duopolists compete for customers not only once but every 
day, much like lobbyists who repeatedly campaign for a political rent. Furthermore, if a political 
party campaigns for electoral votes, it builds a political reputation that may affect not only this 
but also subsequent elections. 
Grossmann and Dietl (2009) extend the basic model with two contestants by introducing two 
periods in order to account for these dynamic aspects of contests.10 As in Section 2.1, the 
contestants differ with respect to the valuation of the prize, where iv  denotes contestant i 's 
valuation of the contest prize. Contestant 1,2i =  contributes effort ,i te  in period  1,2t =  . In 
period 1, contestant i exerts effort ,1ie  and builds up an asset stock ,1 ,i i tE e= . The asset stocks 
1,1E  and 2,1E  determine the probability of success ,1ip  of contestant i in period 1 according to 
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the Tullock CSF given by (1).11 The authors assume that part of the asset stock depreciates 
according to a depreciation factor (0,1)δ ∈ . Contestant i, however, is able to increase the 
remaining asset stock by additionally exerting effort ,2ie  in period 2. Contestant i's 
second-period probability of success ,2ip  depends on the resulting asset stocks 1,2E  and 2,2E  in 
period 2. Expected second-period profits are discounted by the factor (0,1)β ∈ . In both periods, 
efforts ,i te  generate costs according to a weakly convex cost function given by ,( )i tc e  with 
,( ) 0i tc e′ >  for , 0i te > , (0) 0c′ = , and ,( ) 0i tc e′′ ≥ .
12 
Contestant 1,2i =  maximizes expected profits iπ , given by 
,1 ,2
1 ,2
1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
( ) ( )i ii i i i i
E E
v c e v c e
E E E E
π β
⎛ ⎞
= − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
, 
,1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2with  and (1 )i i i i iE e E E eδ= = − + . In order to solve the maximization problem, one has 
to think about the information structure in this model. Whether contestants are able to observe 
the opponent's effort choice after period 1 may influence contestants' optimal strategies. In the 
economics literature, two different concepts have been elaborated in order to solve this kind of 
maximization problem. If effort choices are (not) revealed after the first period and before 
exerting second-period effort, then contestants optimally apply closed-loop (open-loop) 
strategies.13 
According to the model, if the contestants apply closed-loop (open-loop) strategies, then the 
term ,2 ,1/i jE E∂ ∂  for , 1,2i j =  and i j≠  can differ from zero (equal zero). Grossmann and Dietl 
(2009) show that in the case of constant marginal costs c, closed-loop and open-loop equilibria 
coincide. In this case, the optimal asset stocks ,i tE
∗  of contestant 1,2i =  in period 1,2t =  are 
given by: 
                                                                                                                                                       
10In the following, we present a simplified version of the model without revenue sharing. 
11To simplify matters, the discriminatory power parameter γ of the CSF is set to 1γ = . 
12In the case of linear costs, (0)c′ is positive. 
13See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a detailed discussion of open-loop and closed-loop strategies. 
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( )
( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
1,1 2,1 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
2 1 1 2
1,2 2,2 2 2
1 2 1 2
, ,  
[1 (1 )]( ) [1 (1 )]( )
, ,
( ) ( )
v v v v
E E
c v v c v v
v v v v
E E
c v v c v v
β δ β δ
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − + − − +⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
 
In equilibrium, the probability of success is then given by 
, with , 1,2,  , 1,2.
i
i t
i j
v
p i j i j t
v v
∗ = = ≠ =
+
 
It is easy to see that the contestant with the higher prize valuation contributes more effort and 
achieves a higher probability of success in each period if marginal costs are constant. In 
comparison to the basic one-period model, contestants increase their efforts in period 1 because 
the marginal revenues of effort contribution increase due to the transitional effects on 
second-period assets. However, the extension of the basic model does not alter effort 
contributions in period 2 compared to the basic model. 
On the other hand, the optimal behavior of the contestants changes considerably by assuming 
strictly convex costs. In the case of a closed-loop concept, two equilibria are possible. In each 
period, either the contestant with the lower prize valuation contributes more effort or the 
contestant with the higher prize valuation contributes more effort. 
The latter equilibrium is intuitive because the contestant with the higher prize valuation and 
therefore (ceteris paribus) higher marginal revenues exerts more effort. The former equilibrium, 
however, is the counterintuitive outcome and differs from the results in the basic model. In this 
equilibrium, both contestants assume that the contestant with the lower prize valuation 
contributes more effort in both periods. Note that marginal revenues depend not only on the prize 
valuation but also on the effort contribution of both contestants. The contestant with the lower 
prize valuation anticipates that a higher effort contribution in period 1 decreases the opponent's 
second-period efforts.14 Therefore, marginal revenues increase for the contestant with the lower 
prize valuation due to this strategic effect. Otherwise, the contestant with the higher prize 
valuation anticipates that a higher effort contribution in period 1 increases the opponent's 
second-period efforts.15 Thus, marginal revenues decrease for the contestant with the higher prize 
                                                
14The contestant's first-period effort is a strategic substitute for the opponent's second-period effort contribution in 
this equilibrium due to the cross-derivative of the logit CSF. 
15First-period effort of this contestant is a strategic complement for the opponent's second-period effort contribution 
in this equilibrium. 
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valuation. Due to this interaction, it is possible that the contestant with the lower prize valuation 
exerts more effort in equilibrium. 
The extension of the basic model suggests that dynamic aspects may modify contestants' 
optimal behavior. Moreover, due to the result of multiple equilibria, it is not possible to predict 
which equilibrium will actually be reached. 
In the following sections, we narrow the context of general contests and introduce 
peculiarities that are typically inherent in sports contests. We show how these peculiarities are 
embedded in the sports contest models, and we discuss their implications on the optimal 
behavior of the contestants. 
3. Applications of Contest Theory in Sports 
The research in the application of contest-theoretical concepts to sporting activities is primarily 
focused on professional team sports to the comparative neglect of individual (non-team) sports 
such as golf, boxing, athletics, auto sports and the like.16 Although individual sports are 
sometimes organized on a team basis, the teams are not generally organized in leagues ranked in 
line with their success over the season. The main reason why sports economists are interested in 
team sports is that "professional team sports leagues are classic, even textbook, examples of 
business cartels" (Fort and Quirk, 1995).  
In this section, we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will 
show how the Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. For this purpose, 
we will explain the value creation process in team sports leagues in and show how club revenues 
are related to the contest success function. Then, we present some basic modeling issues; for 
instance, we show how the assumption of flexible vs. fixed talent supply depends on the league 
under consideration and how it influences the equilibria. Furthermore, we explicate the effect of 
revenue sharing on competitive balance in the different models. Then we address the relationship 
between competitive balance and social welfare. Finally, we illustrate why many clubs tend to 
"overinvest" in playing talent in many team sports leagues. 
                                                
16Some research has been conducted into individual sports. For instance, see Scully (2000) (athletics); Tenorio (2000) 
(boxing); Shaw and Jakus (1996) (climbing); Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b), Orszag (1994) (golf); Fernie and 
Metcalf (1999) (horse-racing); Maloney and Terkun (2002) (motorcycle-racing); Szymanski (2000) (Olympics); 
Lynch and Zax (2000), Maloney and Terkun (2000) (running). 
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3.1 Value Creation in Team Sports Leagues 
The club-specific revenues of professional sports clubs are largely compiled from five sources: 
Matchday revenue and broadcasting rights combined account for one-half to three-fourths of 
total league revenue, the rest is made up by merchandizing, advertising and sponsoring.17 At first 
sight, any single game and the attention generated by it are relevant for matchday and 
broadcasting revenue. However, when comparing revenues from exhibition games to those from 
championship games, it becomes evident that the value of the latter significantly exceeds the 
value of the former. The value of any game depends on the participating teams' playing strengths. 
But a larger contribution to the game's value is made by the relevance of the game for the 
championship. Seen from this viewpoint, value-creation in professional team sports occurs on 
two distinct stages:18  
On the first stage, the stage of the individual clubs, club-owners invest into the playing 
strength of their respective teams. No single team, however, is able to produce a marketable 
product: any team is in need of at least one opponent. The value of the resulting games can then 
be increased significantly if they are integrated into a championship race. Instead of competing 
for a contest prize, as in the contest models presented above, in sports leagues, each team has its 
own revenue generating function which depends on the degree of success of the team and the 
competitive balance in the league. On the second stage of the production process, the stage of the 
league, single games act as inputs for the production of the final meta-product, the championship 
itself.19 
3.2 Club Revenues and the Contest Success Function 
In this section, we show how club revenues are related to the contest success function. By 
concentrating on matchday and broadcasting revenue and by neglecting the other sources of club 
revenues, Dietl and Lang (2008) and Dietl, Lang, Werner (2009, 2010) derive club-specific 
revenues from a general fan utility function by assuming that a fan's willingness to pay depends 
on the fan type, on the preferred team's win percentage, and on the suspense associated with a 
                                                
17See Deloitte (2004). 
18See Franck (2003). 
19In some leagues such as the European soccer leagues, there exists a third stage, on which the output of the second 
stage, the national champions, represent inputs for a higher-order championship of national champions, the UEFA 
Champions League. 
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close competition (competitive balance).20 
The authors consider a continuum of fans who differ in their willingness to pay for a match 
between club i and club j with quality iq .
21 Every fan l  has a certain preference for match quality 
that is measured by lθ . For simplicity, they assume that these preferences are uniformly 
distributed in [0,1] , i.e., the measure of potential fans is one. Furthermore, they assume a 
constant marginal utility of quality and define the net utility of fan lθ  as max{ ,0}l i iq pθ − . At 
price ip , the fan who is indifferent to the consumption of the product is given by ii
p
qθ
∗ = .22 
Hence, the measure of fans who purchase at ip  is given by 1 i ii
q p
qθ
−∗− = . The fan demand 
function of club 1,2i =  therefore yields 
( , , ) : 1 ,i i ii i i i i
i i
q p p
d m p q m m
q q
⎛ ⎞−
= = −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
where  Rim
+∈   represents the market size parameter of club i . Note that fan demand increases 
in quality, albeit with a decreasing rate, i.e., 0
i
d
q
∂
∂ >  and 
2
2 0
i
d
q
∂
∂
< . 
Clubs are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their market size. For a given set of 
parameters ( , )i ip q , the club with a higher drawing potential ("large-market" club) generates 
higher demand than the club with lower drawing potential ("small-market" club). 
By normalizing all other costs (e.g., stadium and broadcasting costs) to zero, club i's revenue 
is simply ( , , )i i i i iR p d m p q= ⋅ . Then, the club will choose the profit-maximizing price 2
iq
ip
∗ = . 
Given this profit-maximizing price, club i's revenue depends solely on the quality of the match 
and is derived as 4
im
i iR q= . 
The authors further assume that match quality iq  depends on two factors: the probability of 
club i 's success, and the suspense associated with a close competition. The probability of club 
i 's success is measured by the win percentage of this club, denoted by iw . 
                                                
20Note that Dietl and Lang (2008) and Dietl, Lang, Werner (2009) implicitly assume that there is decentralized 
broadcasting such that each club generates its own revenues. For an analysis of centralized versus decentralized 
broadcasting, see Falconieri, Palomino, Sakovics (2004) and Gurtler (2007). 
21See also Falconieri, Palomino, Sakovics (2004). 
22The price ip can, for example, be interpreted as the gate price or the subscription fee for TV coverage of the match. 
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As standard in the sports economic literature, the relationship between talent investments and 
win percentage/probability of winning, denoted by iw , is characterized by the Tullock CSF (1) 
presented in Section 2.1: 
       1 2
1 2
( , ) ii
t
w t t
t t
γ
γ γ= +
,                         (2) 
where it  represents the talent investment of club i .
23 
The suspense associated with a close competition is measured by the competitive balance CB  
in the league and can be specified by the product of the win percentages i jw w .
24 Competitive 
balance attains its maximum of ¼ for a completely balanced league in which both clubs invest 
the same amount in talent such that 1 2 1/ 2w w= = . A less balanced league is then characterized 
by a lower value of CB . 
With the specification of the win percentage and competitive balance, the quality function is 
then derived as 
(1 ) ,i i i jq w w wµ µ= + −  
with , 1,2,i j =  i j≠ . The parameter [0,1]µ∈  represents the relative weight that fans put on 
their own team winning and competitive balance. 
The revenue function of club 1,2i =  is thus given by25 
    ( )2(1 )4 4
i i
i i i i
m m
R q w wµ= = − −           (3) 
Note that club i's revenue initially increases with winning until the maximum is reached for 
1
2(1 )i iw w µ
′
−= ≡ . By increasing the win percentage above iw
′ , club i's revenue starts to decrease 
because excessive dominance by one team is detrimental to match quality. This reflects the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis: the lower the value of µ , i.e., the higher the fans' preference 
for competitive balance, the lower the threshold value iw
′  and the sooner revenues start to 
                                                
23Note that the decision variable in sports contest models is not effort but "playing talent," which is often denoted by 
it  and is measured in perfectly divisible units. 
24See also Szymanski (2003) and Vrooman (2008). 
25This quadratic club-specific revenue function is consistent with the revenue functions used, e.g., in Hoehn and 
Szymanski (1999); Szymanski (2003); Szymanski and Késenne (2004); Késenne (2006, 2007); Vrooman (2007, 
2008). 
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decrease due to dominance by one team. 
If fans only care for their own team winning, i.e. by setting 1µ = , the revenue function (3) is 
linear in iw  and is then equivalent to the revenue function derived in the basic Tullock contest. 
The difference, however, is the interpretation of the parameter im . In the sports context, im  is 
interpreted as the market size of club i, whereas im  is interpreted as the valuation of the contest 
prize of contestant i  in the Tullock contest. 
3.3 Flexible and Fixed Supply of Talent 
In the traditional contest literature, the "supply" of effort ie  of contestant i is perfectly elastic and 
does not influence the supply of the effort of contestant j. In contest models of team sports 
leagues, however, the assumption regarding the supply of talent depends on the league under 
consideration. In the European sports leagues, talent supply is often assumed to be flexible, 
especially after the Bosman verdict in 1995, which has established an international player market. 
In contrast, in the US major leagues, the supply of talent is usually considered as being fixed 
because all talent wants to play in the major leagues. Under the assumption of a flexible supply 
of talent, the number of talent hired by club i has no influence on the talent pool that is available 
to the other club j. That is, a club can sign additional talent without decreasing the number of 
talent in other clubs that compete in the same league. Under the assumption of fixed supply, 
aggregate talent within the league is constant, and the race for talent is a zero-sum game between 
owners. 
We will see that the assumption regarding the supply of talent crucially affects the modeling 
of team sports leagues, in particular the derivative of the CSF. By setting the discriminatory 
power γ  equal to one, the derivative of the CSF (2) is computed as 
               
1 2
2
1 2
(1 )
,
( )
j
i
dt
i dti
i
t t tw
t t t
+ − +∂
=
∂ +
                              (4) 
where the term j
i
dt
dt  is called a conjectural variation. The crucial point regarding this conjecture is 
whether the supply of talent in the league is assumed to be fixed or flexible. As Szymanski (2004) 
has shown, the assumption of a fixed talent supply is often used to justify the so-called 
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"Walrasian fixed-supply" conjecture given by 1j
i
dt
dt = − , which means that a one-unit increase in 
talent hired at team i leads to a one-unit reduction of talent at the other team j. In this case, 
equation (4) yields 
1 2
1 .i
i
w
t t t
∂
=
∂ +
 
In a two-club league, the Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture collapses the non-cooperative 
choice of talents into a choice of winning percentages by only one club owner. Under the 
Walrasian fixed-supply conjectures, the game between profit-maximizing owners loses its 
non-cooperative character and leads to results that are more in line with joint 
profit-maximization. 
In contrast, in a league with a flexible supply of talent, a one-unit increase in talent hired at 
one team does not influence the amount available to the other team. In such a setting, the 
so-called Contest-Nash" conjectures are given by 0j
i
dt
dt = , leading to 
2
1 2
.
( )
ji
i
tw
t t t
∂
=
∂ +
 
Szymanski (2004) argues that the Nash solution to the non-cooperative game of talent choice in a 
professional sports league [...] is inconsistent with the standard representation of the competitive 
equilibrium. According to Szymanski, the so-called Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model is 
not meaningful. This model does not fulfill the conditions of a Nash equilibrium, as the 
incorporation of the constant supply conjectures leaves one team without a choice of strategy. 
Therefore it makes no sense to talk of any conjectural variation other than zero. Moreover, 
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) agree with Szymanski (2004), stating that when the choice of 
one team automatically constrains the other in a two-team model, every possible choice of talent 
is a Nash equilibrium because the other team has only one feasible response, which is therefore 
the "best." However, this clearly makes little sense as an economic model.  
Fort (2006b), however, has replied to Szymanski's criticism of the Walrasian conjectures and 
concludes that the appropriate concept depends on the analyzed league. Moreover, Fort and 
Quirk (2007) show that the competitive talent market model generates a unique rational 
expectations equilibrium. Thus, the disagreement regarding the Nash conjectures vs. Walrasian 
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conjectures still remains an open area for research in the sports economic literature.26 
We will see in Section 3.4 how assumptions about the supply of talent and the corresponding 
conjectural variations lead to different results, for example, those regarding the effect of revenue 
sharing on competitive balance. 
3.4 The Effect of Revenue Sharing on Competitive Balance 
Based on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, professional team sports leagues have 
introduced a variety of measures to increase competitive balance. Two of the most prominent 
measures are reserve clauses and revenue-sharing arrangements. Whether these measures 
actually increase competitive balance is the most disputed question in the sports economics 
literature. According to Rottenberg's "invariance proposition,"27 the distribution of playing talent 
between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property rights 
to players' services. In particular, changes in property rights, such as the introduction of a reserve 
clause, will not alter the allocation of players and will therefore have no impact on competitive 
balance. El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Quirk and El-Hodiri (1974), Fort and Quirk (1995), and 
Vrooman (1995) extend this invariance proposition to gate revenue sharing. 
Traditionally in the sports literature, gate revenue sharing is modeled as follows. The share of 
revenues that is assigned to the home team is given by the parameter 12[ ,1]α ∈ , while (1 )α−  is 
assumed to be the share of revenues received by the away team. The after-sharing revenues of 
club i, denoted by iR
∗ , are then given by  
(1 )  i i jR R Rα α
∗ = + −  
with , 1,2,  i j i j= ≠  and the revenues iR  are given, e.g., by equation (3). Note that a high 
parameter α  represents a league with a low degree of redistribution. That is, 1α =  characterizes 
a league without revenue sharing, while 1/ 2α =  characterizes a league with full-revenue sharing. 
Another popular form of revenue sharing in sports leagues is pool revenue sharing. Under a 
pool-sharing arrangement, each club receives an α -share of its revenue and an equal 
(1 )α− -share of a league revenue pool, where [0,1]α ∈ . In this case, the after-sharing revenues 
                                                
26For further discussions, see Eckard (2006) and Szymanski (2006). 
27Rottenberg's invariance proposition is often regarded as a predecessor of the famous Coase Theorem (see e.g. Fort 
2005). 
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of club i are given by (1 )2 ( )i i i jR R R R
αα −∗ = + + . 
The theoretical analyses regarding the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance can be 
grouped along two dimensions of assumptions: profit- versus win-maximization and fixed versus 
flexible supply of talent. Along the first dimension, club owners may be modeled as either profit- 
or win-maximizers. Profit maximizers do not care about winning percentages unless they affect 
profits. Win maximizers invest as much as they can into playing talent and are only constrained 
by zero profit.28 The second dimension concerns the elasticity of talent supply as discussed in 
Section 3.3. 
According to this categorization, the invariance proposition with regard to revenue sharing is 
derived under the assumptions of profit maximization and fixed supply. There is wide agreement 
that the invariance proposition does not hold in leagues with either win-maximizing owners or a 
flexible talent supply (see Atkinson, Stanley, Tschirhart 1988; Rascher, 1997; Késenne, 2000, 
2005; Vrooman, 2008). There is disagreement, however, over whether the invariance proposition 
holds in a league with profit-maximizing owners and a fixed talent supply. For example, 
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) use the usual Nash conjecture and argue that increased gate 
revenue sharing results in a more uneven distribution of talent between large- and small-market 
clubs, even in a league with profit-maximizing clubs and a fixed supply of talent. 
3.5 Competitive Balance and Social Welfare 
Even though the relevance of competitive balance for demand is intuitively plausible, there is 
mixed evidence on its empirical significance. First of all, it is unclear which dimension of 
competitive balance affects demand the most. Sanderson (2002) as well as Sanderson and 
Siegfried (2003) differentiate three notions of competitive balance: (i) uncertain match outcome, 
(ii) uncertain championship outcome and (iii) long-term uncertainty of outcome, that is, the 
absence of so-called dynasties. Apart of these problems of proxying competitive balance, the 
empirical evidence on the effects of the different notions of competitive balance onto demand 
remains ambiguous. Szymanski (2003) surveys 22 empirical studies and concludes that "ten offer 
clear support for the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, seven offer weak support, and five 
                                                
28For a discussion of the clubs' objective function, see Sloane (1971); Hoehn and Szymanski (1999); Késenne 
(2000a); Fort and Quirk (2004); Késenne (2006); Garcia-del Barrio and Szymanski (2009). 
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contradict it". A similar conclusion is drawn by Downward and Dawson (2000), who state that 
"the evidence suggests that uncertainty of outcome has been an overworked hypothesis in 
explaining the demand for professional sports".29 Note that there is not only mixed empirical 
evidence on the relevance of competitive balance for attendance but also the specifications used 
to examine competitive balance and attendance vary significantly across the studies (e.g., the 
specification of consumer demand and the relevant elements of outcome uncertainty, handling 
the time series characteristics of attendance data beyond a correction for serial correlation etc.).30 
In our opinion, the invariance proposition and the related literature on competitive balance 
miss the point by raising the wrong question. We believe that it is much more important to 
analyze the welfare effects of different assumptions and issues of league design, such as club 
owner objectives and revenue sharing, than their effect on competitive balance. If consumers' 
utility and thus their willingness to pay are increasing in the winning percentage of their 
supported team, then the clubs' individual potential fan bases, their market sizes, must be 
considered when deriving the optimal degree of competitive balance. An additional win of a 
large-market team will generate higher aggregate marginal utility than that of some small-market 
team, due to the larger number of fans deriving utility from that additional win. Therefore, a fully 
balanced league might not maximize social welfare because social welfare does not 
monotonically increase as competitive balance increases. It follows that an exclusive focus on 
the effects of different assumptions and measures on competitive balance may result in 
inefficient policy conclusions. 
Dietl and Lang (2008) develop a contest model of a team sports league to study the effect of 
alternative gate revenue-sharing arrangements on social welfare and confirm this finding. By 
using the usual Nash conjecture, they show that the non-cooperative league equilibrium is too 
balanced. A lower degree of competitive balance would yield a higher level of social welfare. 
Moreover, they challenge the invariance proposition by showing that gate revenue-sharing 
decreases competitive balance. Combining both results, they conclude that in order to increase 
social welfare, arrangements which decrease, not increase, competitive balance should be 
                                                
29See also Borland and MacDonald (2003). 
30See Fort (2006a) who reviews all of the different ways in which game uncertainty, playoff uncertainty and 
consecutive season uncertainty have been measured. Moreover, he shows how the specification error of not 
including all of the different measures of outcome uncertainty can lead to bias in coefficient estimates in demand 
analyses. 
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implemented. 
In another contest model, Dietl, Lang, Werner (2009) analyze the effects of heterogeneous 
club objectives on club profits, consumer surplus and player salaries (social welfare). The 
authors also apply the usual Nash conjecture and show that the social efficiency of measures that 
increase the competitiveness of small-market clubs depends on the league type. If the 
large-market clubs are profit-maximizers, for example, small-market clubs should win fewer 
rather than more games in order to increase social welfare. In such leagues, all measures in favor 
of small-market clubs, such as transfer restrictions and reverse-order drafts, are dangerous 
because they will lead to a decrease instead of an increase in social welfare. Moreover, in 
profit-maximizing leagues, revenue sharing decreases and in win-maximizing leagues it 
increases competitive balance. In both cases, the effect on social welfare is positive because 
profit-maximizing leagues have too much and win-maximizing leagues too little competitive 
balance without revenue sharing. In mixed leagues, on the other hand, revenue-sharing 
arrangements decrease competitive balance and social welfare. 
3.6 The Overinvestment Problem in Team Sports Leagues 
In this section, we will apply the basic contest model from Section 2.1 to explain the tendency to 
"overinvest" in playing talent in many team sports leagues. 
In the past decade, many football clubs in Europe were able to increase total revenues due to 
higher broadcasting receipts, bigger crowds, sponsorship and a more professional approach to 
merchandising. According to Deloitte and Touch (2009), the combined revenues generated by 
the top divisions of Europe's "Big Five" leagues 31  increased by more than 300%, from 
approximately 1.9 billion in the season 1995/96 to 7.7 billion in the season 2007/08. Manchester 
United, the world's second richest club, even augmented its turnover from 25 million in 1990 to 
about 325 million in 2008, an increase by 1200%.32 
At the same time, however, there is growing evidence of a financial crisis spreading 
throughout the European football leagues. Many European clubs face serious financial 
difficulties. Some have even gone bankrupt. Examples illustrating this general tendency are 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
31The "Big Five" leagues in Europe are: Premier League (England, 20 clubs), Ligue1 (France, 20 clubs), Bundesliga 
(Germany, 18 clubs), Primera Division (Spain, 20 clubs) and the Serie A (Italy, 18 clubs). 
32 Economist (2002) and Deloitte and Touch (2009). 
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numerous: In Spain's Primera Division, the total amount of debt in 2008 amounted to 3.2 billion. 
Of the top 40 teams, eight sought protection from creditors to stave off bankruptcy in the last two 
seasons. In particular, FC Valencia is seriously in debt with 502 million.33 In England, the 20 
Premier League clubs actually owe a total of 2.5 billion in bank overdrafts, loans and other 
borrowings; Manchester United and Chelsea are the most indebted clubs, each owing about 810 
million.34 In Italy, the Serie A clubs accumulated total losses of 1.2 billion in the period from 
1995/96 up to 2002/03, with 84% of theses losses sustained from 2000/01-2002/03.35 In 
particular, AC Fiorentina went bankrupt in 2002 and was relegated to the third Italian league. A 
court declared AC Parma insolvent in April 2004 with 310 million in debt. In Switzerland, 
Servette Genf was declared insolvent in February 2005; following FC Lugano and Lausanne 
Sports in 2002, this was the third club to go bankrupt.36 
How can this "paradox of rising revenues and declining profits" be explained? A first 
explanation stresses inadequate club constitutions. As organizations without residual claimants, 
traditional clubs are more likely to behave as win maximizers. Having no ownership stakes in the 
operation and, at the same time, lacking genuine owners as monitors, club managers have the 
discretion to maximize individual utility through sportive success. The chance to privatize a part 
of the fame and glamour derived from sporting success while socializing the inherent financial 
risks creates strong incentives to invest too much in playing talent. However, a closer look at the 
real situation in professional team sports shows the limitation of this constitutional explanation. 
The paradox of raising revenues and declining profits persists even in leagues where clubs have 
been transformed into capitalistic corporations with profit-maximizing owners. Obviously, the 
problem must have deeper roots. 
Based on a contest model of a team sports league with profit-maximizing clubs, Dietl, Franck, 
Lang (2008) deal with these roots. They show that the tendency to "overinvest" in playing talent 
leading to the dissipation of the league's revenue is a direct consequence of the ruinous 
competition between the clubs. In the following, we will briefly explain their model for a league 
with two clubs.37 
                                                
33http://www.football-industry.com 
34Guardian, 2nd of June 2009. 
35Deloitte and Touch (2004). 
36Kicker, 12th of January 2004. 
37Note that Dietl, Franck, Lang (2008a) consider a league with n clubs. Moreover, they assume a flexible supply of 
talent and therefore use the "Contest-Nash conjectures". 
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The authors assume that total league revenue is a concave function of aggregate investments 
in playing talent, given by38 
( )
1
21 2 1 2( , ) .LR t t t t= +  
This function reflects the fact that with raising investments in playing talent, e.g., better 
players, the league becomes more attractive for fans or TV broadcasters. Therefore, the league 
income increases but does so with decreasing returns to scale. The authors consider a league with 
a revenue sharing arrangement in which the defeated club receives also a certain amount of the 
league revenue. The share of the endogenously determined league prize 1 2( , )LR t t  which is 
awarded to the winner of the championship, is given by the parameter 12[ ,1]α ∈ , while (1 ) / 2α−  
is assumed to be the share of the endogenous league prize received by each of the defeated clubs. 
Furthermore, in order to concentrate on the overinvestment problem, the authors consider a 
symmetric league in which both clubs have the same marginal cost of talent investment, i.e., 
1 2c c c= = . 
The league's optimal level 1 2( , )t t  of talent investments maximizes the social surplus of the 
clubs and is defined as 
( )( )
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2( , )
( , ) argmax ( , ) .
t t
t t LR t t c t t= − ⋅ +  
By considering the symmetric league optimum only, the solution to the maximization problem 
is given by 2
1
8
i
c
t = . The terms "overinvest" and "underinvest" are defined as situations in which 
a club invests more and less, respectively, in equilibrium than in the league optimum. 
The expected profit of club 1,2i =  is given by 
    1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) (1 )(1 ) ( , ) .i i i it t w LR t t w LR t t ctπ α α= + − − −                       (5) 
The expected payoff of club i depends on the probability of winning iw  multiplied by the share 
α  of the endogenous league prize 1 2( , )LR t t  awarded to the winner, plus the probability of 
losing (1 )iw−  multiplied by the share (1 )α−  of the endogenous league prize 1 2( , )LR t t  
awarded to each of the defeated clubs, minus the investment costs in playing talent ict . Note that 
                                                
38See also Dietl et al. (2009). In terms of a contest model, the total league revenue can be interpreted as an 
endogenously-given contest prize (see, e.g., Chung, 1996). 
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the probability of winning iw  is again given by the CSF (2). 
Each club chooses an investment level of playing talent such that expected profits (5) are 
maximized, i.e., club i solves max
it iπ . The equilibrium investments for club 1,2i =  are then 
given by 
2
2
(1 2 (2 1)) 1,  ,
232
(1 2 (2 1))(3 2 (2 1)) .
32
i i
i
t w
c
c
γ α
γ α γ απ
∗ ∗
∗
+ −= =
+ − − −=
 
Note that both clubs realize identical, strictly positive investment levels and obtain with an equal 
probability of ½ the endogenously determined league revenue of size 1 2 (2 1)1 2 4( , ) cR t t
γ α+ −∗ ∗ = . 
Expected payoffs are non-negative in equilibrium and thus clubs decide to participate in the 
league competition if either the discriminatory power γ  is restricted to [0, ( )]γ γ α∈  with 
3
2(2 1)( ) : αγ α −=  or the parameterα is restricted to 
1
2[ , ( )]α α γ∈ with
2 3
4( ) :
γ
γα γ
+= . Otherwise, the 
competition does not take place because clubs prefer to abstain.39 
The "ratio of dissipation," which measures the degree of dissipation of the league revenue, is 
defined as40 
2( 1 2 (2 1))( , ) : [0,1],
4
T TD
T
γ αα γ
∗− − + −= = ∈  
where 1 2 1 2: ( , ) ( )T R t t c t t= − ⋅ + and 1 2 1 2: ( , ) ( )T R t t c t t
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= − ⋅ + characterize the net surplus at 
the first-best allocation and the Nash equilibrium, respectively. Note that a higher value 
of ( , )D α γ , implies a higher degree of dissipation of the league revenue. 
Dietl, Franck, Lang (2008) show that if (i) the discriminatory powerγ of the CSF is within the 
interval ( 312(2 1) 2(2 1)( , ] ,α αγ γ∗ − − ⎤= ⎦ , or (ii) the revenue sharing parameterα is within the interval 
( 2 1 2 34 4( , ] ,γ γγ γα α + +∗ ⎤= ⎦ there is a guaranteed existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each club 
invests more than in the league optimum and therefore dissipates parts of the league revenue. 
As a consequence, both a higher discriminatory power and a lower degree of revenue sharing 
                                                
39Note that comparative statics regarding the equilibrium efforts yield the same results as in standard contest models. 
40The ratio D is called 'ratio of rent dissipation' in the rent-seeking literature. 
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contribute to aggravate the "overinvestment" problem in team sports leagues. Intuitively, this is 
clear; if smaller differences in talent investments have a stronger impact on the probability of 
success, then the clubs have stronger incentives for higher talent investments. The same holds 
true for a lower degree of revenue sharing. Moreover, if the discriminatory power or the revenue 
sharing parameterα equals ( )γ α or ( )α γ , then the net surplus T ∗at the Nash equilibrium equals 
zero, and ( , )D α γ  reaches its maximum of one. In this case, the clubs dissipate the whole 
league's revenue. Note that even though marginal costs influence the equilibrium efforts, they 
have no influence on the "overinvestment" problem because altering marginal costs does not 
affect the ratio of dissipation.41 
However, the increase of the talent investments in the Nash-equilibrium compared to the 
league optimum does not affect the probability of success in equilibrium because clubs 
simultaneously increase their efforts and end up with exactly the same relative performance as in 
the league optimum, i.e., 1 21 2( , ) ( , ) 1/ 2i iw t t w t t
∗ ∗ ∗ = = . Even though the clubs would be better off 
if they agreed upon the investment level at the league optimum, this solution does not 
characterize a feasible equilibrium strategy due to strategic interaction, i.e., it cannot be sustained 
without cooperation. Starting at the league optimum it , club i has an incentive to increase its 
talent investments because this behavior raises the probability of success to win the share of 
league revenue awarded to the winner. However, because the other club has the same incentives, 
both clubs are caught in a typical prisoners' dilemma type of equilibrium. As a result, each club 
will enter in a ruinous competition leading to the symmetric Nash-equilibrium where the club 
"overinvests" in talent and achieves no relative gain in performance compared to the league 
optimum. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41Note that ( , )D α γ is independent of marginal costs c because also the league optimum proportionally decreases 
with c. 
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4. Conclusion 
Many types of competitions take the form of contests in which competitors make efforts by 
investing tangible and intangible resources and are rewarded based on their relative efforts. In 
business, for example, employees compete in promotion contests (Rosen, 1986 and Bognanno, 
2001), firms compete in market share contests (Schmalensee, 1976; Piga, 1998), and R&D labs 
compete in patent race contests (Loury, 1979, Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Taylor, 1995). 
Competition in the form of contests, however, is not limited to the world of business. Contests 
can be observed in all fields of social life. Litigation (Baye, Kovenock, Casper 2005; Wärneryd, 
2000; Gurtler and Krakel, 2008), rent seeking (Nitzan, 1994; Farmer and Pecorino, 1999; 
Lockard and Tullock, 2001; Baye and Hoppe, 2003), art competitions, beauty pageants, political 
campaigns (Glazer and Gradstein, 2005; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006), military conflicts 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007), and many other forms of competitions take the form of contests. 
A further, and perhaps the most obvious, application of contests is sports. Not surprisingly, the 
contest aspect of sport has attracted considerable attention in the recent sports economics 
literature (Szymanski, 2003; Szymanski and Késenne, 2004). 
This article presented some basic applications of the theory of contest in team sports leagues. 
After a short outline of the traditional Tullock contest in both a static and a dynamic setting, we 
explained the relationship between club revenues and the CSF. Then, we analyzed the effect of 
revenue sharing on competitive balance depending on the assumptions regarding the derivative 
of the CSF. We further concluded that an exclusive focus on competitive balance may result in 
inefficient policy conclusions. Finally, the article has shown that, due to the contest structure, 
team sports leagues carry the risk of "overinvesting" in playing talent. 
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